The revolt spread quickly over Central- and East-Java, but the center of it still was Jogjakarta. About half of the high nobility supported Diponegoro, besides the biggest part of the Islamic leaders, which saw the revolt as a holy war against the pagan strangers on Java. But a big amount of support also came from the farmers as well. The reason why Diponegoro was accepted as leader among these very various groups, is the believe that he was the 'Ratu Adil' - the 'justified king' - , following the stories someone that would fight a short war and win, which would be the starting point of an era with a better leadership.

Diponegoro was also convinced about this and tried to behave like an Islamic leader for all Javanese, high and low. "His vengeance against us is huge, and he's also aiming at religion as well, " would be the first words of the secretary of the government, which Willem van Hogendorp (the oldest son of Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp) write in October 1826, in which he remarked, "that Dipo Negoro did do everything with less people, and made himself loved through this way again".

The events in Jogjakarta were seen as very worrying by Governor-general Van der Capellen: his departure from the colony was nearing and he didn't have a very nice story to tell when he got back in his home country. A revolt on Java he couldn't really use with that. On July 26 he named the experienced general H.M. de Kock as commissioner of the government over the royal estates with the task to bring back peace in the area as soon as possible.

De Kock traveled to Central-Java as soon as he could, but for now he didn't pass Soerakarta, where the Soesoehoenan said he supported him. In Jogjakarta was resident Smissaert in doubt, while his situation got worse: much more than he and his 200 men strong Dutch guard gathered around the fortress near the kraton and bringing the sultan and the government jewelry to there wasn't possible anymore. At other places the situation for the Dutch was even worse. Many buildings of the government were torn down and some local garrisons were only able to defend themselves with the biggest effort.

Desa's that were lead by leaders which supported the Dutch, were set afire by Diponegoro's supporters, a method which was also used by the Dutch troops from the start of the war. "Eventually we reached the two main desa's, which will be set afire by us, together with two smaller desa's," was written down by a Dutch major in his effort to gain control over hostile areas. "The looters didn't expect us to do things like this, there they left behind almost everything; this loot is now ours and we took as much as we could, and we set fire to the rest of it." Many villages in Central-Java were turned into smoking ruins. When Multatuli spoke about Saïdjah and Adinda in his story "over a village that has just been conquered by the Dutch army, and thus was on fire," he didn't have to use his fantasy.

A group which was hit hard during the first months of the war, were the Chinese. The angry people mainly aimed at the tollbooth owners: many of them were killed and their tollbooths were burned. Sometimes the attacks had the alikeness of a pogrom. In Ngawi, an entire Chinese group was murdered out.

The government commissioner De Kock couldn't act against Diponegoro at the moment. He got some more ground after the biggest part of the Dutch Indies army under the lead of general-major J.J. van Geen returned on Java after a mission against Bone. Semarang could just be saved: a Javanese army of about 10,000 men was about to attack the city. Jogjakarta could also be freed. De Kock decided to fire resident Smissaert right away and invited Diponegoro to negotiate with him. He refused, after which De Kock decided to attack Selarong.

The events that followed, would be typical for the entire Java War: "After the troops in Geblak didn't have much rest", De Kock wrote in his report to governor-general Van der Capellen,' we marched in two groups along two different routs towards Selarong Wetan (east), located along the river Bedog. Before this village we were reunited and general-major Van Geen moved towards the front with a strong infantry division, but he didn't meet anything else than refugees.

He was able to occupy Selarong Koelon (west), the hiding place of Diponegoro and Pangeran Mangkoeboemi, without any problems and set up a post there as well. "I was on my way to Selarong Koelon, when the village was burned and hard to occupy by then. When we were on our way over the river Bedog towards Selarong, that was set afire as well. At that moment I settled my troops east of this location. There the looters were gone very fast, we didn't succeed in getting a single one, and I wasn't able to gain any information about the location where the rebel-leaders had fled."

In other words, the only thing that De Kock had occupied was a smoldering pile of debris. Diponegoro would maintain these guerrilla-tactics: big direct confrontations with the Dutch colonial army were to be avoided, while he tried to exhaust them with small-scale attacks.

No one on the Dutch side had a good answer to the strategy of Diponegoro. Regularly small scale fights took place, which exhausted the Dutch army more and more. Cholera and other tropical illnesses did the rest of the job: a quick Dutch victory was a less likely way, which stimulated the spirit of resistance. Willem van Hogendorp wrote worried: "It's not the war or the number of enemies which is my biggest worry. I rather saw it half-conquered from someone from the outside than in this condition. But it's the spirit of the entire Javanese population from one end to the other, and I add the spirit of our other areas in Borneo, Makassar, through entire Sumatera, they are tired of us."

The colonial prestige was damaged even more when the who guardians of sultan Hamengkoeboewono V were robbed by a guerrilla group under the lead of one of Diponegoro's most skilled leaders, the 18-year-old Prawira Dirdja, better known as Sentot, near Langkong on 30 July 1826. The sixty Dutch soldiers which accompanied the guardians were not able to stop the attack. Only a few of the detachment could escape. The two guardians were killed and several other Jogjan princes were taken prisoner and brought to Diponegoro.

He was influenced by Kyai Madja more and more, a very fanatic Islamic spiritual leader which believed in the holy war and didn't want to know anything about a compromise. The imprisoned princes were killed without excuse. The 30th July 1826 was one of the most glorious days of Diponegoro: the victory over Sentot confirmed to many Javanese that Allah was on his side and not on the side of sultan Hamengkoeboewono V, whose guardians weren't protected by higher powers.

Again the Dutch colonial future was at risk because of this: everywhere in Central-Java the Dutch troops were attacked and Soerakarta was also threatened now. On advice of De Kock, the government took strong actions: from Penang the very old and banned (in 1812 by Raffles) sultan Hamengkoeboewono II was brought to Jogjakarta and inaugurated as sultan in September. The government hoped that sultan Sepuh - the grandfather of Diponegoro - would have more power over the population than the Ratu Adil. This seemed to be a total mistake: only a few took the old sultan seriously. Sultan Sepuh would die in early 1828.

The chances in the war changed only after De Kock adapted his military strategy to that of Diponegoro. His troops were divided into six, and later ten, mobile teams of about 700 men. This units were able to operate on their own and were able to act on an attack of Diponegoro quickly. At the same time De Kock decided to follow several of his commanders and to create fortifications in areas where the Dutch troops had forced out the men of Diponegoro. In a short time, about 100 of these benteng were built, which were later seen as a safe spot by the population and where you could trade freely. While De Kock won the farming population for him slowly, the area that was controlled by Diponegoro got smaller. It also became harder to supply his men, so he had to loot villages.

Cut of from the desa's that supported him, Diponegoro threatened to loose his power. Once he tried to break the colonial power with a big gesture. In March 1828 he gathered thousands of his supporters in the area between the rivers Progo and the Bagawanta to name him sultan of entire Java. Times had changed. In the midst of the festivities he was raided by Dutch troops, he could barely safe himself.

The revolt of Diponegoro didn't have any success and the war more looked like a cat and mouse game in mid 1828. In November Kyai Madja fell in Dutch hands after breaking with Diponegoro earlier that year. More important was the surrender of prince Mangkoeboemi in September 1829. This last event also made clear to the Javanese that there was no hope left for Diponegoro. A month later Sentot also decided to lay down his weapons. With his men he went into Dutch service.

Diponegoro, left alone by his people of the first hour, surrendered. In February 1830 he informed his opponent De Kock that he wanted to negotiate about the termination of the war. The meeting between the Ratu Adil and the Dutch commander finally took place on 28th March in Magelang. Here, Diponegoro demanded his safety by the Dutch, together with several hundred of his companions. Quite a high price for termination of the hostilities. The colonial government had to acknowledge him as a sultan and as leader of the Islam on Java. It were big demands from a defeated leader, on which De Kock didn't want to agree about, but which were good for him as well.

"It wasn't unpleasant to me and I had expected it as well, that he would come up which such idiot demands," he reported to the governor-general. "This gave me the opportunity to say that we were not to accomplish to such demands, but that I saw him as my prisoner from that moment on." Against all promises, Diponegoro was captured by De Kock, which meant the end of the Java War. The Ratu Adil, which couldn't fulfill his call, was transferred to Batavia almost immediately and later banned to Manado (and later to Makassar). There, he would die in 1855.