The Java War was the result of several complex developments which had caused a deep and structural crisis in central Java. Responsible for these developments, which had partially started before 1800, were not only the colonial leaders, but also the Javanese royals.

In a paradox, several of the problems were caused by the period of peace and economical growth which has followed on the division between 1755 and 1757 of the principality of Mataram in the principalities Jogjakarta, Soerakarta and Mangkoenegaran. This good period later lead to the creation of more new rice fields and a strong growth of the population. The number of Javanese that was related to the royal courts and had to be maintained by the royals also grew. This last meant that the royals had to take care of a raise of their income and to extend the number of apanages – where the servants were paid with – at the same time.

In Jogjakarta, sultan Hamengkoeboewono II made up something against that. He solved his problem to recalculate the already given apanages in 1802 and 1808, but now with a shorter measuring instrument than before. This trick made the apanages a little smaller and the royal estate larger. The result was that the direct income of the sultan could increase and he could also give away more apanages. The ones who had to pay for it were the Javanese farmers. The owners of the apanages tried to gain the same income from a smaller apanage, which caused taxes to rise.

The Soesoehoenan of Soerakarta had the same problems as his rival in Jogjakarta and he also took actions which raised taxes which were put at the farmers. Parts of the remote areas which were up to then always governed by local regents, were made into apanages, mostly destined for his own family. The government of these new apanages – and also taxing them – was given into the hands of demang, which were often Chinese and not Javanese, and didn’t act very open against the farmers. In Jogjakarta as well as in Soerakarta the relatively wealthy farmers were forced paying an ever increasing tax, which worsened their economical position little by little.

The actions which were taken by the colonial rulers after the turn of the century did only increase the problems of the Javanese farmers. Efforts of Raffles to introduce estate interest in the royal estates as well resulted in a further increasing economical pressure. It was his meaning to replace the obliged deliveries of agricultural products and services by the landlords with the estate interest, but in practice the Javanese aristocracy kept demanding this traditional tax as well. The start of the estate interest didn’t mean anything else than more tax. A majority of the farmer-population, which was used to live in a climate of exchanging products, had to borrow money to pay their taxes, which caused them to be in debt at the Chinese money lenders.

Another action of Raffles also reinforced the position of the Chinese at the cost of the Javanese farmer-population. After the attack on the kraton of Jogjakarta in 1812, the British lieutenant-governor had demanded tax from income of markets and toll-booths. The organization of these markets and toll-booths was then transmitted to the Chinese, which didn’t have anything against it to gain as much money from it as possible. Javanese farmers – with didn’t have anything to do with toll-booths until 1755 – could eventually not reach any market place without passing such a toll-booth. They also had to wait a very long time before being thoroughly checked by the Chinese. In the meanwhile, their packing animals were not allowed to graze on the estate of the Chinese, or they had to pay a high fine. Waterbuffalos were regularly confiscated as well. The toll that was demanded, often proved to be higher than the total value of the goods that was brought to the market.

The deeds of the Chinese caused the amount of money that was gained from taxes from Jogjakarta between 1812 and 1824, to rise with 700 percent. Chinese tolling people were loved among the government and hated by the Javanese population. This hate only strengthened because the Chinese succeeded in getting monopoly positions in the sale of opium and the organization of gambling. They were the only to operate with gambling- and opium-houses. Furthermore they demanded protection money from the gold- and silver-works and they demanded import tax on imported salt. Chinese tollbooth people were thought to expressively and extendedly body-checking Javanese women, to check for jewelry or other expensive products for smuggling.

Chinese also rented, just like several Europeans, estates from the Javanese apanage-owners. The Javanese farmers which lived on these estates, were obliged to cultivate all kinds of products for exports, like coffee, indigo, pepper and sugar. The cultivation of rice suffered from this obligation, while the income for the farmers was low. The situation on the estates was – as known – a big problem to Van der Capellen, but the way he ended the problems, caused other problems, especially among the Javanese aristocracy which had rented the estates and had partially spend their income from the interests.

The problems in the area got worse following the dry years of 1821, 1822 and 1824, the outbreak of a cholera-epidemic and the floods in 1823. This all lead to a growing social unrest, which resulted in a growing insecurity. The number of robberies on Chinese tollbooths increased dramatically, while small revolts took place in Kedoe and Bagalen in 1822, which were suppressed by the colonial regime quickly. The unhappiness among the population rose quickly and steadily, and it was just waiting for someone charismatic which could translate the unhappiness into organized revolt.

This charismatic leader would be Pangeran Diponegoro, which was born in 1785 as the oldest son of sultan Hamengkoeboewono III. Diponegoro was grown up outside the kraton, on the estate of his grandmother and under the supervision of Islamic teachers. In contrary of the rest of the family of the sultan, Diponegoro aimed at things like studying the Quran and Islamic right. Between 1805 and 1808 he encountered several religious experiences which convinced him that he would become the future royal ruler of Java. At the shore of the Indian Ocean he even met Kangjeng Ratu Kidul, the goddess of the South sea, which told him that Jogjakarta would fall within three years, he should not make a problem of the Dutch and that he would start the destruction of Java, which would lead to a period of justified rule.

In Jogjakarta meanwhile, a younger half-brother of Diponegoro (son of one of the official wives of the sultan) had ascended the thrown as Hamengkoeboewono IV after their both father had died in 1814. The new sultan was still a minor and the real power came in the hands of a group of people around his mother, Ratoe Iboe, and the patih, Pangeran Adipato Danoeredjo IV, a man with his roots on Bali. The new rulers would construct good relations with the Dutch resident Nahuys van Burgst after 1816 to help him with his efforts to let Europeans and Chinese rent his estates. They also adapted to the European way of life, which irritated Diponegoro.

The position of the rulers seems to be very unstable suddenly in December 1822, because - under mysterious circumstances - the fourth sultan suddenly died. His follower, the three-year-old Hamengkoeboewono V, got Diponegoro as his ‘father’. Patih Danoeredjo IV hold on to the right over the royal estates and with that in fact the most important part of the real power of the sultanate, also because the Dutch colonial civil servants traded with him at the scene. The tensions in the kraton got worse because of the eruption of the Merapi - a clear sign to Diponegoro of bad things to come - and the actions of Governor-general Van der Capellen against the hire of estates to the Europeans and Chinese which left a big part of the aristocracy flat-broke.

Many in the royal estates were unhappy: the farmers because of the high taxes and the actions of the Chinese tollbooth owners, a big part of the aristocracy which felt betrayed by the Dutch, and Diponegoro, which felt locked out and could only watch at the Jogjan rulers which more and more abandoned the traditional Javanese lifestyle.

Eventually the Java War would break out over a very small conflict, especially small seen the deeper backgrounds of the revolt: the tax raise by the royal leaders, the introduction of the estate interest by Raffles, the increase of the number of tollbooths and the actions of the Chinese tollbooth owners, the problems around the estate renting, the religious inspiration of Diponegoro and the dynasty intrigues and rivalry in the kraton of Jogjakarta. At the end of May 1825, resident Smissaert decided to improve several roads in the sultanate, of which one ran over the estate of Diponegoro, Tegalredja.

The works were lead by patih Danoeredjo, which took the opportunity to hurt his rival. With little pawls he marked the new road through several graves of the family of Diponegoro. The result was that several men of Danoeredjo got in a fight with supporters of Diponegoro, which finally sought shelter on his estate and demanded that Danoeredjo was fired by resident Smissaert. Smissaert refused to take actions on this and send Diponegoro’s uncle, Pangeran Mangkoeboemi, to Tegalredja to negotiate.

The time of talking had gone already: Diponegoro didn’t want to have anything to do with the Dutch anymore and Mangkoeboemi decided to team up with his nephew. On July 20th Dutch troops attacked Tegalredja. Diponegoro and Mangkoeboemi succeeded in escaping and settled in Selarong, determined not to rest before the Dutch were forced out of Java: the Java War was a fact.