Escalation

The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 marks the beginning of the present conflict. Almost immediately upon Suharto’s resignation, reports of crimes committed during the DOM period of the 1990s began to flood out of Aceh and people began to mobilize to demand justice. There was widespread anticipation in Aceh that under Habibie’s new democratic regime, the members of the military responsible for human rights violations during the DOM period would be held accountable and punished. Habibie took important first steps towards fulfilling this wish. He formally lifted the DOM status, established fact-finding commissions, and authorized investigative reports. However, to the great disappointment of the Acehnese, no military officers were punished. On August 7, 1998, the head of the army, General Wiranto, formally apologized for the wrongs committed by the military, but this was considered insufficient, as it did not lead to the prosecution and punishment of the responsible officers. The government’s failure to redress the crimes committed in Aceh led to increased popular support for independence, and for the armed secessionist group, GAM.

Continued military presence in Aceh heightened the tension. A large number of military personnel were scheduled to leave Aceh by August of 1999. However, the ceremony for departing troops was marked by a riot, an event that was cited by the military as justification for maintaining a presence in Aceh. Many believe that the military was responsible for instigating the riot.

In the relative freedom of the post-Suharto government, GAM members who had relocated to Malaysia during the DOM-period began to return. This increase in personnel and the supplies in an environment of increasing public anti-Indonesia sentiment allowed the organization to grow quickly. One of its first actions took place in December 1998, when GAM allegedly carried out an attack on Indonesian soldiers returning from leave. The army, (TNI) responded with a retaliatory attack on GAM-members who were believed to be responsible. Additionally, the military increased its presence in Aceh. This sparked a further increase in GAM activity.

Confused government policy exacerbated existing tensions and led to increased support for independence. In January 1999, following a referendum on independence for East Timor, Habibie stated that Aceh would also have the opportunity for a referendum, but later retracted this statement. However, in response to his comments, Acehnese movements for justice expanded their goals and began to demand self-determination for Aceh via a referendum. At the center of this new movement was a student-led group known as SIRA (Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh, or Information Center for a Referendum on Aceh). Government repression of SIRA, a moderate, non-violent movement, further damaged the relationship between Aceh and the Indonesian government.

In an environment of escalating tension and increasing violence, in June 1999, Habibie made another attempt to curb discontent in Aceh by appointing a twenty-seven member Independent Commission to investigate crimes committed during the DOM period. Although the report produced by the commission discussed thousands of cases of violence, it only recommended five of these for prosecution. Out of these five, only one case was actually tried. Further attempts to gain closure on this period and to obtain justice for victims by establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission have been stalled in parliament and show no signs of coming to fruition.

Abdurrahman Wahid, who became president in October of 1999 was not much more successful than his predecessors at stopping the violence. Under his presidency, however, negotiations facilitated by the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) (now known as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) began between the government and GAM. HDC was able to facilitate an agreement for a "humanitarian pause", which was signed on May 12, 2000. The agreement fell somewhat short of a ceasefire and was essentially an attempt to get the parties talking with the goal of reducing violence and eventually reaching a negotiated agreement. It called for setting up committees composed of individuals from both GAM and the government to discuss security and humanitarian issues and violations of the pause. The pause, now known as "peace through dialogue" was renewed once and although elements of it remain in effect, it is viewed by some as ineffective. Violent attacks committed by both sides "against each other and against civilians" continued.

The military, still a powerful force in Indonesian politics, placed great pressure on President Wahid to authorize strong military action against GAM. In April 2001, the politically weakened leader issued Presidential Instruction No. 4 (Inpres), activating a six-point plan for Aceh. As part of the Inpres, Wahid authorized the military to conduct a 'special operation' ("Operation for the Restoration of Security and Upholding the Law"). The goal of the operation was to systematically root out and eradicate GAM and GAM activity. The Indonesian Red Cross states that between the beginning of June and mid-July, 150 people had been killed and 800 homes had been burnt to the ground.

So far this year over 1,000 people have died as a result of the conflict. GAM and military activity has forced many to abandon their homes and villages. Many live in fear as both sides engage in the human rights abuses, including the kidnapping and murder of civilians believed to be military informers or GAM members. Civilians are reluctant to report crimes committed by either GAM or the security forces out of fear for their personal safety. In most cases it has been impossible to determine who is responsible for acts of violence. "Unknown person" has become the most widely used term for the perpetrators of crime, as uniforms are rarely worn and each side blames the other for the attacks.

Autonomy Legislation

At the root of the conflict lies Aceh’s dissatisfaction of its economic relationship with the central government. GAM has played upon this sentiment to amass popular support for its goal of secession for the province. The government recognizes that resource revenue and governance have been sources of the continuing conflict. Accordingly, since 1998 it has taken gradual steps towards providing a more equitable split of revenue between Aceh and the government and increased autonomy for Aceh over its internal affairs. This process has gone hand in hand with the government’s national initiative to devolve power from the central government to the provinces.

In 1999, laws No. 22 and 25 were passed by the parliament (MPR), increasing the power of local governments and providing for a percentage of each province’s natural resources to be returned to the province. Under these laws, Aceh gained 15 percent of net public income from its oil production, 30 percent from natural gas, and 80 percent from its forestry, mining and fishing industries. At the same time, an additional law, No. 44, was passed. Under this law, Aceh gained a 'special status', that allowed it the right to organize and manage its own religious, cultural and political affairs, within the general guidelines determined by the government. This legislation was considered insufficient by most Acehnese, as the law did not give a significant percentage of natural gas and oil revenue back to the province. Therefore, the laws did little to stem the violence.

In August 2001, new legislation was passed giving significantly more revenue to Aceh "55 percent of the income it derives from mining and oil, and 40 percent from natural gas. The new law will not go into effect until early 2002. However, it could be an important step towards demonstrating the good intentions of the government towards improving its relationship with Aceh. As of yet, many in Aceh are unimpressed. SIRA has expressed its continued desire for the people of Aceh to choose their own path through a referendum, stating that the law is the voice of the legislators and the political elite in Aceh, rather than the wish of the people themselves. GAM representatives have also stated that the law is insufficient, demanding justice for the crimes committed during DOM and secession.

There may be further reasons for the people to doubt the government’s ability to follow through. The provinces of Indonesia have yet to receive any revenue promised under laws No. 22 and 25 and administrative provisions for paying the money to the provinces are not established. While the government may wish to resolve the economic situation, they may be prevented from doing so by macroeconomic constraints. Conditionality on loans provided by the World Bank and the IMF as well as austerity measures imposed by the international financial institutions have proved to be challenging obstacles "most of the money, instead of being distributed to the provinces" is being used to pay down Indonesia’s considerable debt.

Facilitated Negotiations

Negotiations facilitated by the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), have been ongoing since 2000 and officially, an agreement on security arrangements between the Indonesian government and military and GAM remains in place. While the negotiations have been successful at opening lines of communication between the government and the rebel movement, they have not been successful at curtailing the violence. On July 1, 2001, the Indonesian government suspended the Joint Committee on Security Matters, established by the agreement, until the top GAM commander, Abdullah Syafi’ie, joined the negotiation process. The Joint Committee on Humanitarian Affairs was also dissolved, as provided for in an earlier agreement. However, both sides agreed that they would provide for the security of each other’s members. Despite this security guarantee, in late July, six members of the GAM negotiating team were detained at district police headquarters in Banda Aceh, supposedly for questioning. This triggered an outcry from the international human rights community and has threatened the future of the negotiations. All but one, who was taken to Jakarta for further questioning, were subsequently released with conditions about a month later.

Likelihood of Continuation

President Megawati Sukarnoputri, who took office in August 2001, has already apologized to the people of Aceh for the events of the 1990s. In the eyes of many observers, this is insufficient, considering she is the third successive president to offer such an apology. Further, she signed the most recent autonomy bill into law, demonstrating her intent to improve relations with the troubled province. On the other hand, as an avowed nationalist, she has also made it clear that rebel activity will not be tolerated and that secession will not be tolerated. Megawati, on August 24, 2001, asked Thailand’s prime minister, Thaksin Sinawatra, to help halt the smuggling of small arms into Aceh and has increased military activity to eradicate GAM. Many have expressed concern that Megawati seems to rely upon the military for political support. As such, it is feared that she will give the military a freer hand in dealing with GAM. It remains to be seen whether the recent autonomy legislation will lessen public support for GAM. In the short term it appears that violence will continue.